

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GEORGE 01712 271324Z

43

ACTION IO-13

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FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

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INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 1712

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PORG, GY

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: NASC FONMIN WILLS COMMENTS ON
KOREA RESOLUTION, CUBANS AND ARABS

REF: GEORGETOWN 1709

SUMMARY: GUYANA'S FOREIGN MINISTER CLAIMS NO REAL CONSENSUS
WAS ACHIEVED ON THE NORTH KOREA RESOLUTION OR ON CUBA'S PUERTO RICO
RESOLUTION BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS (14 AND 25)
EXPRESSED. THE NORTH KORANS BY THEIR BEHAVIOR AT THE CONFERENCE
AND AT PANMUNJOM HAD LOST RESPECT AND CREDIBILITY. MANY DELEGATES
FELT DUPED BY THE NORTH KOREANS. THE CUBANS HAD OVERPLAYED THEIR
HAND ALSO. NEXT THE NORTH KOREANS, HOWEVER, IN WILLS' DISFAVOR
WERE THE ARABS WHO, IN ADDITION TO BEING QUARRELSOME, HAD
SHOWN THAT THEIR INTERESTS WERE EXTREMELY NARROW AND THAT THEY
HAD NO CONCERN FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD. END SUMMARY.

1. THIS IS THE SECOND OF THREE CABLES REPORTING FONMIN WILLS'
COMMENTS TOME AUGUST 25 ON THE NASC AND CONCERNS THE NORTH KOREAN
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PAGE 02 GEORGE 01712 271324Z

AND PUERTO RICAN RESOLUTIONS AND CRITICISM OF THE ARABS.

2. WILLS SAID THAT NO REAL CONSENSUS HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE DPRK RESOLUTION OR ON CUBA'S RESOLUTION ON PUERTO RICO. ON THE LATTER, 25 DELEGATIONS HAD EXPRESSED ORAL RESERVATIONS AND ON THE KOREA RESOLUTION 14 ORAL RESERVATIONS WERE EXPRESSED. WITH THIS NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS NO ONE COULD CLAIM CENSENSUS HAD BEEN REACHED. WILLS ASSERTED HE HAD ORALLY EXPRESSED GUYANA'S RESERVATIONS ON BOTH RESOLUTIONS. GUYANA'S POSITION WOULD BE PUT BEFORE THE CABINET AND, IF THE CABINET APPROVED, GUYANA'S RESERVATIONS WOULD BE SUBMITTED IN WRITING.

3. WILLS PLACED PART OF THE BLAME ON SRI LANKA FOR THE STRONG LANGUAGE IN THE DPRK AND CUBAN RESOLUTIONS. EARLY IN THE DISCUSSIONS WHEN SOME DELEGATES WERE ARGUING THAT NO CONSENSUS COULD BE ACHIEVED ON THE STRONG LANGUAGE OF THE RESOLUTIONS, CUBA'S DELEGATION HAD URGED, AND THE SRI LANKIANS HAD AGREED, THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT AGREE FULLY WITH RESOLUTIONS COULD EXPRESS RESERVATIONS AND THAT SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY COULD BE CALLED A CONFERENCE CONSENSUS. WILLS SAID HE HAD BEEN AND REMAINED STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THIS FORMULA.

4. WILLS THOUGHT THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE BIG LOSERS AT THE CONFERENCE. THEIR BEHAVIOR WAS SUCH THAT THEY EMBARRASSED AND UNDERCUT THEIR SUPPORTERS. THEY HAD BEEN EXTREMELY AGGRESSIVE AND CONSEQUENTLY OBNOXIOUS. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER NO CONSENSUS HAD BEEN REACHED ON THEIR RESOLUTION IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THEY INTERRUPTED A SESSION OF THE ECONOMIC GROUP WHEN THE INCIDENT IN THE DMZ OCCURRED WITH A DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE US WAS PROVOKING A CRISIS IN KOREA. ONCE THE CONFUSION HAD SETTLED DOWN MANY DELEGATES FELT THEY HAD BEEN DUPED AND USED. BY THE TIME THENASC ENDED, THERE WAS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED OPINION THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD DELIBERATELY CREATED THE INCIDENT TO PROVOKE A REACTION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. WILLS PREDICTED THAT NORTH KOREA'S INFLUENCE AND SYMPATHY FOR ITS POSITION HAD BEEN REDUCED AND WOULD DECLINE FURTHER. WILLS' FINAL COMMENT ON THE NORTH KOREANS WAS "THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT NON-ALIGNMENT MEANS".

5. WILLS ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE CUBANS WERE OVERLY RABID IN PROMOTING THEIR PET ISSUES. THEY MOVED TOO EARLY AND TOO INSISTENTLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GEORGE 01712 271324Z

TO HAVE EXERCISED MAXIMUM IMPACT. HE OBSERVED THAT JAMAICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, DUDLEY THOMPSON, HAD "GONE BEYOND THE NECESSARY IN PRAISING CASTRO".

6. THE ARABS WERE "ANOTHER PROBLEM" THEY FOUGHT AMONG THEMSELVES ON SOME ISSUES, MAKING QUITE A SPECTACLE. KHADAFI WAS A "MADMAN". BUT MORE IMPORTANT, IN WILLS' MIND, WAS THAT ARAB PERFORMANCE AT THE CONFERENCE MADE CLEAR THEY CANNOT BE COUNTED UPON TO

ASSIST THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IN CONCRETE WAYS, I.E; MONEY. THEY SUPPORTED INDONESIA ON THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE AND MADE KNOWN THAT THE REASON FOR THEIR SUPPORT WAS THAT INDONESIA WAS A MUSLIM COUNTRY. THIS ALIENATED A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS UNNECESSARILY, AS SEVERAL OTHER PLAUSIBLE REASONS FOR THEIR POSITION COULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN. THE SAUDI ARABIAN DELEGATION MADE A POINT OF ANNOUNCING THAT THE AM HAD 38 ARAB NATIONS IN ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE ARABS HAD BROUGHT ALONG TO THE CONFERENCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AS AN OBSERVER.

7. TO UNDERLINE HIS DISTASTE FOR THE IMPRESSION THE ARABS MADE, WILLS COMMENTED THAT "ALTHOUGH I'M NO GREAT LOVER OF ISRAEL-- THEY ARE SELLING WEAPONS TO SOUTH AFRICA-- BUT IN A STRATEGIC SENSE I THANK GOD THE ISRAELIS ARE KEEPING THE ARABS BUSY".

8. COMMENT: I INTEND TO CHECK WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF GUYANA'S DELEGATION TO VERIFY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY SHARE WILLS' PERCEPTION OF THE NORTH KORANS BEING "LOSERS" AT THE CONFERENCE. HIS CLAIM THAT GUYANA EXPRESSED ORAL RESERVATIONS ON THE KOREA AND PUERTO RICO RESOLUTIONS WAS NEWS TO ME.
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